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CONCLUSIONS 
Robert J. Huston 
Manager, Graphite Fibers Risk Analysis Program Office 
NASA Langley Research Center 
I would now like to summarize. Referring to figure 1, 
we have developed and exercised a risk analysis method. You 
should recognize, and I want to emphasize, that our risk 
estimates are very preliminary. Sensitivity analysis has 
not been done. Only civil transport aircraft accidents have 
been considered as a source of accidentally released graphite 
fibers. We intend to study the question of the potential 
release of graphite fibers from accidents with general 
aviation, including helicopters, which is the remaining 
category of civil aircraft to be considered. Let me add 
that we do not anticipate a large increase in risk due to 
this additional source. In fact, I doubt very seriously 
that it is going to increase by even a factor of two. We 
have already completed a survey of fire accidents in general 
aviation. We find that the total empty weight of general 
aviation aircraft that are involved in fire accidents, which 
represents an upper boundary on the potential carbon fiber 
released from general aviation, is approximately one-fifth 
of the empty weight of civil transport aircraft involved in 
fire. Unless there are some unusual circumstances when we 
consider a large number of small sources, we may already 
have at least an order of magnitude estimate on the total 
risk by studying air transport aircraft alone. 
CONFERENCE SUMMARV 
A RlSK ANALYSIS METHOO HAS BEEN EXERCISED 
RISK ESTlkiATES ARE VERY PRELIMINARY 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN OONE 
ONLY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS A SOURCE 
DATA BASE IS STILL SPARSE FURTHER STUDY NEEDED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS 
FlBER RELEASE FROM LARGE FIRES 
POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION VULNERABILITY 
EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY (WITH REALISTIC FIBER LENGTH SPECTRA1 
INDUSTRIAL FACILITY VULNERABILITY 
COSTING TECHNIQUES 
SOME ELERENTS ARE STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT. I.E.: 
FIRE PLUHE - DISPERSION MODELS 
FIBER LIFE - REDISPERSION DATA 
Figure 1 
235 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19790014038 2020-03-20T19:01:29+00:00Z
With reference to our data base, further study is 
needed in a number of areas. For example, both OR1 and 
A. D. Little assumed that from 5 to 25 percent of the carbon 
fiber in an aircraft would be released in a crash. However, 
in Dr. Bell's presentation, he points out that, in the case 
of fire accidents, approximately 1 percent or less of the 
fibers might be released. In the case of fire followed by 
an explosion, 10 percent of the weight of carbon might be 
released as free fibers. Therefore, we should note that 
considerable conservatism has been included in the current 
A. D. Little and OR1 analyses. As we acquire further data, 
we may see a further reduction in the risk profiles from 
this one area alone. 
We do not have enough information on power generation 
and distribution vulnerability. Ansel Butterfield pointed 
out in his presentation that power distribution was a key 
item in assessing cost impacts on factories. We at NASA are 
heavily dependent upon the activity of the Department of 
Energy who has responsibility for evaluating carbon fiber 
effects on power distribution systems. We need to 
evaluate equipment vulnerability with a more realistic fiber 
length spectrum. Most of the fiber chamber testing has been 
done with rather moderate length fibers. Israel Taback 
showed you the effect on vulnerability of short, medium and 
long fibers for a very limited sample of equipment. The 
available vulnerability test data is primarily based on a 
range from six to ten millimeters. We note that the mean 
exposure level goes up drastically when short fibers are 
used in the tests, which, by itself, infers that the probability 
of damage is less but there may be more fibers. We need to 
continue studying industrial facility vulnerability to 
identify key areas for further tests. We need to look at 
the different approaches to costing in order to have better 
confidence in the cost impacts of our risk estimates. 
Some elements are still under development. Up to now, 
we are using some simple fire plume models, and they may be 
adequate in the long run. However, we recognize that a 
combined fire plume dispersion model, that would also allow 
computation of the amount of fiber that may be consumed in 
the actual fire, may show a further reduction in potential 
damage. To date, the only large outdoor test data we have 
is the China Lake experiment and it appears that we have had 
a large amount of fiber burned up in that particular experiment. 
The question of fiber life and redispersion was covered 
in Dr. Elber's presentation. We have to establish what would 
happen if a small precentage, say one percent of the released 
fibers, continue to be redispersed from an accident site for a 
period of time. That effect has not been included in our 
risk assessment estimates to this point. 
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Now I am going to go out on a limb and make a judgement 
about the risk. Our preliminary estimate indicates that 
the public risk due to accidental release of carbon fiber 
from air transport aircraft is small. You may judge it in 
your own way, but I believe that the risk is small with 
respect to the national benefits that can be obtained from 
carbon fibers. We should recognize that there is a balance of 
payment issue involved in terms of foreign sales of commercial 
aircraft and a significant fuel import and cost savings 
offered in the application of graphite composites. We 
do need further work to increase our confidence in this 
estimate. To reemphasize our schedule, we anticipate completing 
our "final" risk assessment in 1 year. These conclusions 
are summarized on figure 2. 
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PANEL RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS 
Question: Regarding exterior exposure.. .where can you draw a line 
between this area as being contaminated and an area outside 
that for which you need not be concerned? 
Response: Israel Taback 
If you do it on a computer there's no limit; that is, if you 
really believe the exponential model, then all the way down to 
where you drop one fiber on a piece of apparatus, there is some 
probability of doing some damage. In the real world when the prob- 
ability of damage gets so small compared to the normal failure 
rates of equipment, then I think you have to forget it - the equip- 
ment would be normally repaired anyhow and the damage would not be 
noticed. It's a rather difficult question really; as you saw for 
some of the exposures the failure rates go down as the areas go up, 
so as you try to extrapolate the total damage you really don't know 
where to end the computation. Eventually, we know the computations 
will converge. The answer to your question however, is that with 
the concept that a single fiber'can do damage, you must at least 
numerically extrapolate it all the way out to where fibers can 
land. 
Question: Question related to describing risk in terms of criti- 
cality (i.e. loss of communications say in White House) rather 
than in terms of dollars. 
Response: Bob Huston 
We are currently only trying to quantify the risk in terms of 
cost for the civil community. However, we do need to assess the 
cost to protect any kind of activity that we think is critical. 
Israel Taback 
I just wanted to remind the audience that there was a third 
study underway with respect to other measures of risks, which is 
being done by George Washington University. We don't have those 
results in yet but we are going to look at that study to see what 
other measures should be used in evaluating the risk. 
Dr. Karen Credeur 
My comments would be to echo these two comments, and also to 
say that Dr. Kalelkar pointed out in his talk that he will be look- 
ing at secondary costs and perhaps some of those secondary costs 
will get into just the issues you're talking about. 
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Question: Question regarding relationship of vulnerability to 
deposition and exposure. 
Response: Dr. Wolf Elber 
I think in most cases that we've looked at, if you go through 
an analysis, you'll find that first of all deposition is usually 
proportional to exposure so that they are related--in most cases 
they are proportional, so that if we measure the vulnerability in 
terms of exposure even if inside the box might be deposition 
critical, we're getting a number which is proportional to the cri- 
tical term. 
Question: There is a substantial amount of fiber that is manu- 
factured overseas. A logical way of shipping it into the 
United States might be by air and therefore has the case of 
an accident involving raw unprepregged or raw carbon fiber as 
a cargo been considered? 
Response: Dr. Credeur 
We are considering exactly that scenario for a worst case. 
Question: Question related to vulnerability of civil aircraft. 
Response: Bob Huston 
One of our objectives is to look at the need for protection t 
civil aircraft. We have right now Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas 
working with us analyzing all of their air transport aircraft to 
see if there is a need for protection to air transport aircraft. 
That is being evaluated right now, not as a part of the input to 
our risk assessment, but as a separate issue. 
Israel Taback: 
There is one thing that is in work that I don't think we 
emphasized previously - that was our concern about general avia- 
tion aircraft as well as the larger scheduled commercial aircraft. 
We are evaluating some of the electronic components that are in 
the lighter aircraft to see what the extent of risk might be for 
airplanes parked on the apron. To date, what we've tested hasn't 
failed, but I suspect that some day we will run into a box that 
does, then we'll evaluate it. 
.O 
Question: IS there a size effect below which you would not worry 
about the vulnerability of electronics? 
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Response: Israel Taback 
Yes, there is a critical size, but I'm afraid it varies with 
the electronics. First, you always have to worry because of the 
fact that if you put a lot of fibers into a piece of apparatus, 
you may bridge the gap with more than one fiber. On the basis 
that those probabilities are much lower than the bridging of a 
gap with a single fiber; however, you must usually worry about 
the relative length of the gaps and the single fibers. For most 
commercial apparatus where people aren't worried about space, 
these gaps typically range from a sixteenth of an inch to a quar- 
ter of an inch. In military equipment and in space work, where 
you kind of build the devices from the outside in and room is 
very important, many of the circuit traces on circuit boards may 
be as little as ten thousandths of an inch apart, and you must 
then worry about very short fibers. 
Question: Question related to vulnerability sensitivity to fiber 
length. 
Response: Israel Taback 
I can only give you a guess at the present. I think the 
longer fibers would not be a problem for any internal equipment 
because it's very hard for them to get through filters or even 
window screens. Short fibers of millimeter length are probably 
of no concern because they are too short. My guess is that equip- 
ment will generally be most vulnerable to fibers ranging in length 
from 1 to 4 millimeters. 
Question: Question related to dispersion sensitivity to fiber 
length. 
Response: Israel Taback 
The dispersion doesn't vary much with length. These fibers 
tend to fall parallel to the ground; and independent of length, 
they have the same fall velocity. 
Question: Question related to fall velocity of fibers. 
Response: Bob Huston 
They always fall at terminal velocity, if that's what you 
mean. 
Israel Taback 
Well I wouldn't say always. I think when the fibers get long 
enough so that they are essentially not straight lines, so that 
they have some curvature to them, they'll fall at various velocities 
with a spectrum of fall rates. As long as they're short and stiff 
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they seem to be stable in a horizontal attitude and fall at a 
rate which is independent of length, 
Question: Question related to whether or not electrical util- 
ities and substations were considered in the risk 'assessment. 
Response: Dr. Fiksel 
In our description of vulnerable facilities I attempted to 
summarize the categories we looked at and we failed to show the 
fact that we did look at gas and electric utilities. Those were 
included. 
Question: Is the length of the released fiber related to the 
length of the fiber in manufacture and would manufacturing 
techniques affect the lengths of released fibers? 
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell 
I believe the only evidence we have seen that that might be 
SOI first of all, is in the burning and explosion of woven com- 
posites where you have crossovers during the weaving process and 
there may be weaknesses built into the fiber, thus causing it to 
break up prematurely into short fibers. The other exception 
seems to be the long fibrous particulate strips which came off in 
the outdoor spoiler fire at China Lake where the long strips seem 
to be quite closely related to the lengths and dimensions of the 
composites in the spoilers' skins. 
Question: Have you done any tests on chopped fibers? 
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell 
No, we have not. We have sure thought about it because many 
applications will involve chopped fibers. The fiber is already 
cut to size once you have burned the resin off. There are some 
problems with mounting such a type of composite and holding the 
fibrous residue before you can impact in some fashion. But we 
are still thinking about doing that. 
Question: Have you tried to compare the incident with the incin- 
erator incident of several years ago? 
Response: Bob Huston 
The answer is no, but we have thought of it and we would 
like to get the appropriate data. We believe that if we could 
get the appropriate data from the incinerator incident that we 
could make a good attempt at predicting what happened. 
242 
Question: The statement was made that you did look at the power 
generation --distribution systems. Could you give us some 
idea of the. . (vulnerability estimates). . in terms of 
transfer function or the sensitivity of this type of equip- 
ment? 
Response: Dr. Fiksel 
I do not have the detailed figures in my head, but I could 
show them to you afterwards. We considered several different 
types of equipment, including the switch room and switching 
apparatus. 
Dr. Kalelkar 
As far as outdoor equipment is concerned, the clumps and 
the larger pieces are the ones to be more concerned about. As 
yetI those have not been incorporated in our analysis. 
Question: There has been very little mention of ground trans- 
portation vulnerability in the risk assessment. The impli- 
cation is that ground transportation is not vulnerable. Is 
that true? 
Response: Dr. Leon Pocinki 
We did not include it in the calculations we showed, pri- 
marily because of the tremendous impact on our thinking of a 
recent strike of the metro system in Washington. This strike 
ended up causing some inconvenience 
else. 
to the public, but not much 
Dr. Fiksel 
In our study, the major ground transportation systems that 
we had identified as being vulnerable were the modern mass-tran- 
sit systems which have electronic controls, such as the Washington 
subway. There is also a subway system in Boston, where we did 
include some estimates for vulnerability of the control apparatus. 
Question: Is it possible that we can expect soon to have some 
sort of standardized test plans so the manufacturer can say 
"Here is my gadget or what have you. I would like to get it 
tested." Can I then take the results of that (to determine 
the source potential of the part) and feed it into all 
these models and what have you? 
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Response: Dr. Vernon Bell 
Yes, at one time the military services had a little gadget 
which they hoped to use for detection of carbon fibers that were 
on the loose. 1'm not sure what the status of that is. I think 
it is available. Whether it's been developed sufficiently to pass 
on, I'm not sure. We do have an activity going within the NASA 
program, in particular with Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who is try- 
ing to come up with a small, fairly portable device which could 
hopefully be used to not only detect and count but also perhaps 
measure the sizes of fibers. It was not intended for that purpose 
and it's still in the very early stages, but, if we're very fortu- 
nate, perhaps it could lead to something of that nature. 
Bob Huston 
Let me also point out that in the alternate materials program 
there is an intent to provide a standardized burn test, so that 
material A and material B, tested at two different places, give 
comparable test results. 
Question: Question for Dr. Bell. Correct me if I have this wrong. 
The woven fabric panels worked very good from a burn only and 
burn plus a moderate explosion but in a severe explosion they 
looked worse than the unidirectional and cross ply laminates. 
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell 
For the woven fabric, the woven material seemed to resist burn 
and burn plus small impact reasonably well. However, the case of 
the burn and the high impact or explosion seemed to lead to more 
individual fibers. 
Question: Question related to the fiber lengths used in the 
vulnerability testing. 
Response: Israel Taback 
Regarding the fiber lengths, I tried to give you some idea 
on the slide - they range from about 3 at the low end to about 
12 millimeters at the high end. I designated them as being small, 
medium, and large. Those tests were performed, quite a number of 
them, here at Langley Research Center. We have a small test cham- 
ber. They were performed by carefully injecting fibers that were 
cut to size into a room at the best uniform concentration we could 
and testing the equipment in as close to the use condition as we 
could. That is, if it had a ventilating fan, that was on: if it 
was thermally ventilated, that's the way it was tested. 
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Question: What were the sample sizes? 
Response: Israel Taback 
Actually its the test numbers that I think you're interested 
in. After any failure the equipment was cleaned and repaired if 
it needed a repair. The normal number of tests was of the order of 
six and ranged to as much as perhaps 20 or so on one specific type 
of equipment. 
Question: Was vulnerability testing conducted with a spectrum of 
fiber lengths? 
Response: Israel Taback 
At present, we have never used a mixed spectrum. The fibers 
have been cut to specified lengths and then tested one length at a 
time. 
Question: You mentioned the maximum anticipated.cost for an 
accident worst case situation as 12 million dollars possibly. 
Looking at the .Tenerife situation where the damage cost of 
one of the airplanes involved was substantially less than the 
insurance associated with the problem, I am wondering if it 
would be worthwhile to plot on your last plot, where you show 
the effect of tornadoes and other weather conditions, etc, 
the total cost of an airplane accident so that you might get 
a barometer for the insurance rate increase and also possibly 
show better the real effects of graphite fibers. 
Response: Dr. Kalelkar 
In other words, you would like to see the incremental addition 
in loss of carbon fiber being utilized in connection with an air- 
plane accident. Certainly we can do that and you will see something 
like that before we get finished with our study. However, I want 
to point out to you that from the point of view of the people who 
suffer the risk, the people who fly in an airplane that gets in an 
accident do so on a voluntary basis, but the people who get hit by 
the carbon fiber in the aftermath of such an accident take on that 
risk on an involuntary basis, so that the comparison has to be made 
rather carefully. From the point of view of people who live miles 
away from that accident, the only reason that accident affected 
them is because of carbon fiber composites and, from their perspec- 
tive, they wouldn't be that interested in the differential between 
the carbon fiber cost and the total cost. 
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Dr. Karen Credeur 
There's another point, and that is that sometimes when you 
get into insurance costs and liability suits, you get into the 
question of costing human life. That question gets into a lot 
of problems, as some of you may have seen on 60 Minutes some time 
in the last few months. 
Questions: I assume that DOT is following your work and will use 
your data. How are you interfacing with DOT-automotive, 
and what are they doing? 
Response from the floor: William Leavitt, Department of 
Transportation 
What we're doing is getting acquainted with the problem of 
expected loadings of cars, vulnerability of the ground transporta- 
tion system, etc. Hopefully we will get to a point that we can use 
all the risk techniques that have been developed here and by others 
that Bob mentioned and feed our inputs into this set of models, if 
you will. We are probably a year behind Bob's effort. 
Bob Huston 
Let me say that we are working together. Let me also make 
a general statement, that may or may not be obvious. In my origi- 
nal list of activities, I mentioned the various DOD laboratories 
that are supporting us and, of course, we are aware of some of the 
technical things that they are doing. We've had contact with the 
Department of Energy. They have some contracted activity. The 
National Bureau of Standards is doing some work for us and at 
least one of their people is here today. We hope to mutually sup- 
port these efforts. 
The risk assessment methodology that was presented this morn- 
ing for commercial aircraft is not going to be terribly different 
from that for automobiles. Therefore, once the Department of 
Transportation can define the automobile parameters as inputs to 
the source data, I think they can generally use the remaining 
methodology. 
Question: Is there any indication as to when the automobile indus- 
try will be planning to start utilizing carbon fibers, and 
secondly is there any indication of where, by virtue of the 
liability associated with fibers? 
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Response from the floor: William Leavitt, Department of 
Transportation 
The best input we have so far, and most of this has been from 
Ford, is that they are looking forward to a flange. In particular, 
the thing that people are talking about is an air conditioning 
mounting flange in the next couple of years. Bill Burlant has told 
me that his best guess would be something like five pounds.of com- 
posites by 1985 or 1990. In other words, it is not very much as 
things stand right now. If the picture would change, if someone 
came through with a real breakthrough in terms of cost or in terms 
of techniques for fabricating the automotive type component, it 
could be a different ball game. I should also mention that Ford 
has what they call an experimental lightweight car that has a lot 
of carbon fiber composites - I think it is 400 pounds: leaf 
springs, drive shafts, hoods, door reinforcements, a lot of gad- 
gets inside. This is completed. They plan to show it at the 
SAE show in February in Detroit. But right now it looks like 
there isn't going to be much carbon fiber composite loading. 
Comment from the floor: Four or five pounds per car times 
the number of cars produced per year is more pounds than 
are projected for aircraft. 
Comment from the floor: This subject has come up in two composite 
sessions that have been held by the Society of Manufacturing 
Engineers. In each case, the manufacturer points outvery 
clearly that they are doing a great deal of experimenting 
with composites in cars, hoods, doors, drive shafts, and push 
rods. Although this experimentation is very interesting from 
a test stand point, the key parameters that are affecting the 
automotive industry are (1) fifty dollars a pound, which is 
several orders of magnitude higher than the automobile people 
wanted to pay right now, and (2) gasoline mileage require- 
ments for the year 1985 and subsequently are driving them in 
the direction of composites, so they are kind of straddling 
that horse. I don't think we are going to see a large intro- 
duction of composites in cars in the very near future. 
Question: Is the soot produced by the incomplete combustion of the 
matrix an electrical problem? 
Response: Richard Pride 
In the Dahlgren shock tube, we have exposed two of the 
amplifier units that are on display in the back of the room 
to approximately one hour of smoke and soot, not from the 
epoxy matrix, but from the incomplete combustion of the JP-1 
fuel, and had no problems whatsoever from that source. 
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Bob Huston 
Dick Heldenfels mentioned yesterday morning at least one 
incident involving an aircraft that burned and apparently there 
were some electrical problems downwind of that aircraft. There 
was no carbon on that aircraft. Apparently there is a potential 
problem (from other than carbon fibers). 
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